Our objective was to identify and establish consensus on the most important safety features of GP computer systems, with a particular emphasis on medicines management. We used a two-round electronic Delphi survey, completed by a 21-member multidisciplinary expert panel, all from the UK. The main outcome measure was percentage agreement of the panel members on the importance of the presence of a number of different safety features (presented as clinical statements) on GP computer systems. We found 90% or greater agreement on the importance of 32 (58%) statements. These statements, indicating issues considered to be of considerable importance (rated as important or very important), related to: computerised alerts; the need to avoid spurious alerts; making it difficult to override critical alerts; having audit trails of such overrides; support for safe repeat prescribing; effective computer-user interface; importance of call and recall management; and the need to be able to run safety reports. The high level of agreement among the expert panel members indicates clear themes and priorities that need to be addressed in any further improvement of safety features in primary care computing systems.
Introduction
There is an increasing body of evidence that errors in primary care result in harm to patients, particularly in relation to medicines management. 1 Most prescribing in the United Kingdom (UK) is undertaken by general practitioners (GPs), and it is here that attention needs to be focused in order to reduce the disease burden associated with errors in medicines management. Computer systems, which are now routinely used in UK primary care, have considerable potential for preventing medication errors and improving patient quality of care. [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] In addition, the UK Government has recently launched several strategic initiatives to ensure further integration and harmonisation of computerisation throughout all areas of health care. 1, 7 The critical issue in using technology to maximise prescribing safety is that computer systems should be set up so that prescribers are alerted if they try to take an action that is likely to be hazardous. However, this is not made explicit in the Requirements for Accreditation -the National Health Service (NHS) Information Authority regulated core requirements -to which all GP systems should be capable of performing. 8 Indeed, we are aware that some systems are deficient in terms of the alerts that they issue. 9, 10 Therefore, identifying particular situations where patient safety might be compromised, and developing a conceptual framework within which to analyse these situations, is likely to prove beneficial.
Our aim in this study was to identify and reach consensus on the key clinical scenarios involving patient safety for which GPs might benefit from information technology (IT) support, particularly in relation to medicines management. The study was a part of a larger project funded by the National Patient Safety Agency to explore the potential of computer systems for improving patient safety in primary care.
Methods
In order to reach consensus on the most important issues among experts, we used an electronic Delphi technique. The Delphi approach has been widely used in healthcare research as an approach to establishing consensus. 11, 12 One recent example is its use in the development of health service indicators. 13 Figure 1 shows the steps involved in the two-round Delphi procedure used in this study.
Initially we compiled a database of 30 experts drawn from those in academic, clinical, administrative and business settings, whose work has been directly relevant to the application of computers in medicine. From this group we purposefully selected an expert panel of 22 members. Our selection criteria aimed to ensure an adequate breadth of expertise and perspectives on general practice computing and patient safety as well as availability of the selected people within the timeframe of the study.
Through searching the literature and drawing on clinical experience, two members of the research team (AA and BS) identified an initial list of medicines management errors/safety considerations where a possible role for IT-based solutions has been considered. These issues were then formalised into clinical statements and shared among the full study team for comments and refinement. Based on this feedback, we selected statements agreed by the entire multidisciplinary team as being potentially important and incorporated these into a questionnaire for circulation to the Delphi panel members.
The questionnaire was circulated by email to the Delphi panel members in two rounds. Respondents were asked to score the importance of each statement on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from very important to irrelevant. The scores from the first round were circulated to the Delphi panel along with the questionnaire for the second round. The panellists were asked to score the questions in the second Delphi round having considered all the scores, and any comments, from the first round. Consensus was defined as having been achieved if 90% or more of the panel members rated that statement as 'important' or 'very important' after the second round.
Based on advice from the local research ethics committee, we did not need ethical approval for this study. The two-round Delphi process was conducted during the first quarter of 2003.
Results
All 22 panel members invited to take part in the study agreed to participate. One panel member, however, failed to reply to the first Delphi round questionnaire and was therefore excluded from the second round. All 21 members who completed the first round went on to complete the second round. The professional backgrounds and key characteristics of the Delphi panel are given in Table 1 .
We formulated 55 clinical statements, and these were incorporated into our questionnaires. Statements considered important by 90% or more of respondents after round 2 are given in Table 2 ; statements that were considered important by less than 90% of respondents are shown in Table 3 .
We found 90% or greater agreement for 32 statements, with an average agreement on the importance of these questions of 98%. For 42 statements, the agreement was 80% or more and for only five items were levels of agreement below 70%.
The key themes around which consensus was achieved were:
. the importance of computerised alerts . the need to minimise spurious alerts . making it difficult to override critically important alerts . having audit trails of such overrides . support for safe repeat prescribing . effective computer-user interface . importance of call and recall . the need to be able to run safety reports.
In terms of the computer-user interface the following were considered important:
. making it difficult to override hazard alerts . providing a clear display of alerts . highlighting drugs with similar names . having mechanisms to ensure that prescribers recorded the reasons why any particularly serious hazard alerts were overridden.
Repeat prescribing issues were also considered important:
. drug overuse . drug underuse . items being requested beyond the agreed review date . whether or not the item had been authorised as a repeat prescription.
Other safety issues considered important included:
. 
Discussion
Our multidisciplinary Delphi panel reached agreement on the importance of a range of safety features relating to GP computer systems. The results are likely to provide relevant information for policy makers and developers of GP computer systems, given that we used a well-established technique for consensus building, worked through a multidisciplinary expert panel, and achieved a high response rate from participants. GP computer systems used in the UK already have many of the safety features identified in our modified Delphi study. For example, current Requirements for Accreditation of computer systems ensure that interaction alerts, allergy alerts and certain aspects of repeat prescribing are covered. 8 However, in a previous study we have shown deficiencies in GP computer systems in terms of contraindication alerts, the presence of spurious alerts, managing repeat prescribing and warning about similar drug names. 10 These are safety issues that were considered important by our Delphi panel.
In the UK we have fed our results back to the National Patient Safety Agency and the National Programme for Information Technology in the NHS.
14 It is hoped that our findings will help to inform the safety requirements for GP computer systems in coming years. Our 35 When a patient requests a repeat prescription the computer should make it clear whether the item requested has been authorised as a repeat
100%
36 When practice staff try to print out a repeat prescription it should be clear whether the item requested has gone beyond its review date 5 100%
38 When practice staff try to print out a repeat prescription they should be alerted if patients appear to be either under-using or over-using their medicines 4 90% findings may also be relevant to other countries that are considering the safety features that need to be available on computer systems used in primary care.
FUNDING
This study was part of a series commissioned by the National Patient Safety Agency. 32 When setting review dates these should not go beyond a year OR when setting numbers of repeats the maximum number allowed should be 13
71%
33 In order to help monitor medication adherence the prescriber should be requested to state the expected length of time between prescription requests 3 33%
34 In order to help monitor medication adherence it should be easy for practice staff to review the frequency of previous issues of specified prescription items
81%
37 If a patient requests a repeat prescription beyond its review date the user should be prompted to request that the patient attends for a prescription review 4 86%
Section 3: General safety issues
Decision support (no agreement below 90%)
Interface (no agreement below 90%)
Coding 46 The user should be warned if they use a code that may not trigger an intended alert, e.g. the code 'history of asthma' may not trigger an alert if a non-cardio-selective beta-blocker is subsequently prescribed
71%
Monitoring (no agreement below 90%)
Lab links
49 It should not be possible to automatically file all normal lab results, e.g. a negative urine culture might require action if the patient had presented initially with haematuria
86%
Reporting and clinical audit (no agreement below 90%)
